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Capital Retrials and Resentencing:
Whether to Appeal and Resentencing Fairness
Whitnan J. Hou*
I. The E nd Is Ody the Begmng
The end of a capital murder trial is the end only in name. What follows is
the beginning of a lengthy appellate process. In the more obvious case of the
death-sentenced defendant, appeal is mandatory and automatic to the Supreme
Court of Virginia.' The automatic appeal may allege trial error and/or sentenc-
ing phase error? The court must review disproportionality of the sentence and
whether the sentence was the result of passion or prejudice.' If a new trial is
awarded for trial error, both the guilt and penaltyphases will be relitigated before
a new jur-y. In such a case, it is clear that the death sentence is available to the
new jury.' If, however, only a new sentencing proceeding is awarded, the new
jury, which has the death sentence available, will be deciding life or death on less
evidence than that available to the original jury.
A life-sentenced defendant, however, is not provided an automatic appeal;
instead the appeal is both voluntary and discretionary, must allege trial error, and
is reviewed by the Court of Appeals of Virginia.6 Until recently, a life sentence
* JD. Candidate, May2004, Washington &Lee UniversitySchool of Law-, B.S., University
of California, Los Angeles. The author would like to thankProfessor Roger Groot and the students
of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, in particular Priya Nath, for their assistance, edits,
insights, and for keeping me on track through this arduous ordeal. This article is dedicated to my
parents, Jonathon P. Hou and Tao-Jan Hou, and my sister, Bertina Hou, for their continued love
and support during my abrupt career change.
1. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(A) (Mvchie 2003) ("A sentence of death, upon the
judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed on record by the Supreme
court").
2. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q (stating that the court may consider any errors
enumerated by appeal).
3. Id (describing the factors the court must consider when reviewing a death sentence on
automatic appeal).
4. See Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 446, 452 (Va. 2001) [hereinafter Giam ]
(ordering a new trial because allowing an unqualified juror to remain on the jury constitutes
manifest error); Green v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E.2d 834, 850 (Va. 2003) [hereinafter Gnml]
(finding no error in the new trial).
5. See Gn nI, 546 S.E.2d at 452 (ordering a new trial because allowing an unqualified juror
to remain on the jury constitutes manifest error).
6. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-406(A) (Mlchie 2003) (stating in pertinent part: "[A]ny
aggrieved party may present a petition for appeal to the Court of Appeals from (O any final
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was believed to be an implied acquittal of death! Under that premise, the
successful appellant could be retried for capital murder and be subjected onlyto
a maximum punishment of life imprisonment After Sauazahn v Pemrg1nia,9
that result is doubtful." Capital practitioners should, therefore, be cautious
about appealing such cases.
This article will examine the difficulties posed by the two paradigms in
reverse order. In Part II, the article will address how life-sentenced capital
defendants have lost double jeopardy protection. It will then suggest analyses
designed to clarify which defendants can safely appeal and which cannot safely
do so. Part III of the article will then examine the death-sentenced defendant
and the difficulties faced bythe defendant at resentencing if his appeal is success-
ful.
I. The L tfeS~en dCapitalDOfe viat
A defendant, found guilty of capital murder, can be sentenced to life
imprisonment in Virginia in one of four ways: (1) unanimous verdict for life
with no finding of aggravating factors; (2) unanimous verdict for life because the
juryfinds both mitigators and aggravators; (3) a statutorilyimposed life sentence
because the jurydeadlocked on punishment; or (4) the judge, after review of the
post-sentence report, sets aside the jury's death verdict and imposes life. An
appeal bya life-sentenced capital defendant is reviewed bythe Court of Appeals
of Virginia. 1 A successful appeal bya life defendant can onlyoccur if there was
error in the first trial' 2 If the conviction and sentence are reversed, the defen-
dant receives a completely new trial."
For over two decades, defendants sentenced to life appealed their sentences
with the assurance that the double jeopardy bar protected them from death
conviction in a circuit court of a traffic infraction or a crime .... "). Sewrady VA. CODE ANN.
S 17.1-407(C) (Mlchie 2003) (stating that the petition for appeal maybe granted by the reviewing
judge on the basis of the record); VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-407(D) (stating that if the petition is not
granted under subsection (C), the counsel for petitioner is entiled to present orally before a panel
of judges the reasons why the appeal should be granted).
7. Bullington v. Mlissouri, 451 US. 430, 444-46 (1981) (holding that a life sentence acts as
an acquittal of death and bars death on retrial because the capital sentencing procedure resembled
a trial on the issue of guilt).
8. Id
9. 537 US. 101 (2003).
10. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110 (2003) (holding that only a unanimous
finding that the State had failed to prove any aggravators will result in an acquittal of death).
11. The life- sentenced defendant cannot appeal the sentence because life is the minimum on
a capital conviction. Also, he cannot appeal based on sentencing phase error because, as he received
life, no sentencing phase error could have prejudiced him.
12. See Gnm I, 546 S.E.2d at 452 (noting that the defendant could appeal his life sentence
because the trial court erred in the seating of a juror).
13. Id
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sentences in their new trials if their appeals were successful.14  The recent
decision in Sattazahnplaces that conclusion in serious doubt. Satazahnstratifies
capital murder and limits the protection of the double jeopardy bar."
A. DweJeqary
In 1981 the United States Supreme Court held in Buirgtonu Missow' 6 that
double jeopardy barred the imposition of a death sentence in a retrial after a
defendant is sentenced to life.'" In Bul in&t4 the juryunanimouslyimposed a life
sentence and did not indicate whether it found any aggravators." Under the
controlling Mfissouri statute, the jury was required to find that the alleged aggra-
vator existed beyond a reasonable doubt before it could sentence a defendant to
death. 9 The Court held that for purposes of double jeopardy, a unanimous
jury's finding for life meant that the defendant was acquitted of death." "Chief
Justice Bardgett, in his dissent from the ruling of Supreme Court majority,
observed that the sentence of life imprisonment which petitioner received at his
first trial meant that 'the juryhas already acquitted the defendant of whatever was
necessaryto impose the death sentence.' We agree."2'
InA na v Rtmey,22 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a sentenc-
ing scheme similar to that in Bu/lirm 23 In Arizona, however, the trial judge
acted as the sentencer." Like the jury in BuL tw the trial judge sentenced the
14. See amr0y BuMigwn 451 U.S. at 430. Since BuIi" a life sentence effectively pre-
vented the State from seeking death in a retrial.
15. Saazahn, 537 U.S. at 112 (stating that murder plus a finding of aggravators is a separate
offense from murder and failure to find aggravators).
16. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
17. BuL6" 451 US. at 444-46 (holding that a life sentence acts as an acquittal of death and
bars death on retrial because the capital sentencing procedure resembled a trial on the issue of guil).
The life sentence from the first trial means that the jury has already acquitted him of whatever was
necessary to impose the death sentence. Id at 445; see US. CONST. amend. V (providing that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
18. BdIim, 451 U.S. at 436.
19. Id at 434; see MO. REV. STAT. S 565.012.4 (1978) (stating that a jury "must be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that anyaggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds to exist
are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty'). The current controlling statute has
a similar requirement. Ser MO. REV. STAT. S 565.032 (1999) (providing that a judge or jury shall
consider whether an enumerated statutory aggravating circumstance is established by the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt).
20. BuNritm; 451 US. at 446.
21. Id at 445 (quoting State e 7d. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 922 (Mo. 1980)
(Bardgett, CJ., dissenting)) (internal citations omitted).
22. 467 US. 203 (1984).
23. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,209 (1984).
24. Id at 205.
2003]
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defendant to life, but he also issued a special verdict indicating that his decision
was basea on the absence of aggravating factors." The Supreme Court of
Arizona remanded the case for resentencing because it found that the trial judge
misinterpreted one of the enumerated aggravating factors.26 On resentencing,
the trial court again returned a special verdict, but this time found one aggravat-
ing circumstance and sentenced the defendant to death.27 The Supreme Court
of Arizona, relying on BuM!ird reversed the death sentence and imposed life.2"
The United States Supreme Court affirmed because it was clear that the original
life sentence was based on the State's failure to prove any aggravating factors.29
In Sattazahn v Per =um a , 30 the Supreme Court made an already complex
issue far more intricate. 1  The factual circumstances in Sauazahn were very
similar to Bllt" except that the jury in Sattazahn's first trial was deadlocked
at 9-3 in favor of life.32 In accordance with state law, the trial judge dismissed the
jury and sentenced the defendant to life." The Court held that the life sentence
from the first trial did not act as an acquittal of death because the sentencing
body, the jury, "made no findings with respect to the alleged aggravating circum-
stance. That result-or more appropriately, that non-result-cannot fairlybe called
an acquittal 'based on the findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the
life sentence.' "3
In Part III of Sattaza?; Justice Scalia posited that " 'murder plus one or
more aggravating circumstances'is a separate offense from 'murder' simIidter."3
He based his statement on Ring v A ri/rni, 36 which mandated that any element
that raises the maximum punishment a defendant mayreceive must be found by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.37 Because aggravating factors change the
maximum punishment, murder plus aggravating factors is a specific and separate
offense from murder absent aggravating factors.38 For double jeopardyto apply,
25. Id at 205-06.
26. Id at 207.
27. Id at 208.
28. Id at 208-09.
29. Rme, 467 US. at 212.
30. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
31. Satazairn 537 U.S. at 106 (examining whether double jeopardy barred the imposition of
the death penalty on retrial when the life sentence from the first trial was statutorily mandated
because the jury could not agree to a sentence unanimousl).
32. Id at 104.
33. Id at 104-05.
34. Id at 109 (quoting Rwtne. 467 US. at 211).
35. Id at 112.
36. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
37. Samzabn, 537 US. at 111; Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584, 609 (2002).
38. Satazab 537 U.S. at 112.
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the sentencing body must clearly show that its decision for a life sentence was
based on the State's failure to prove aggravating circumstances. 9
B. The V*zia Smte6g Sder
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 governs sentencing proceedings in capital
cases.40 The sentencing proceeding is held before the same jurythat determined
the defendant's guilt.4' During the sentencing phase, the jury must consider any
mitigating evidence presented by the defendant.42 The jury may impose a
sentence of death onlyif the Commonwealth has proven the existence of at least
one statutory aggravator, vileness or future dangerousness, beyond a reasonable
doubt.43 If the jury cannot agree on the penalty, the judge must dismiss the jury
and impose a life sentence." In addition, even if the juryretums a death verdict,
the court may, after review of the post-sentence report, set aside a sentence of
death and impose a life sentence.45
39. Id at 113.
40. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie Supp. 2003) ("Upon a finding that the
defendant is guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death, a proceeding shall be held
which shall be limited to a determination as to whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment.").
41. SeeVk CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3(C) (ichie 2000) ("If a jury finds the defendant guilty
... then a separate proceeding before the same jury shall be held as soon as is practicable on the
issue of the penalty. ... ").
42. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,117 (1982) (holding that state courts must consider
all relevant mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("[Tjhe Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering,z a
nih faact; any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.").
43. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Q. Section 19.2-264.4(C) states:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove
beyond' a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of te rior
hiitory of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission o the
offense of which he is accused that he would commit crimia acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in commit-
ting the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile.
Id; see also Rig 536 U.S. at 609 (holding that any factor that raises the maximum punishment that
a defendant may receive is an element of the offense and must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(E); sealso Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 399
(Va. 1990) (stating that section 19.2-264.4(E) is applicable only after a reasonable period of
deliberation and a finding that further deliberations would be fruitless).
45. SeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Mfichie Supp. 2003) (stating that the court mayset aside




The state of the law regarding double jeopardy barring retrials for death is
now unclear. Bui, and Rursey appeared to make clear the plain rule that a
verdict for life imprisonment, by judge orjury, is considered an acquittal of death
for purposes of double jeopardy.46 Double jeopardy would bar death on retrial.
Satazabn introduces the notion that a life verdict does not necessarily bar
death on retrial." At a minimum, Satazakn stands for the proposition that a
statutorily mandated life sentence imposed after a jury deadlock at the penalty
phase is not an acquittal of death and does not bar death on retrial.48 On the
other hand, it can be extremely far-reaching. If a jury sentences a defendant to
life imprisonment and does not indicate that the determination was unanimously
based on the State's failure to prove aggravators, the double jeopardy bar may
not protect a defendant from death in a subsequent retrial.49 This circumstance
negates the protection that Bu6li"gtm provided- that any life verdict effectively
barred death in a retrial-'
The language in Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(E) is similar to the
Pennsylvania statute in Sautaza/n.s' The Pennsylvania statute states that "the
court may, in its discretion, discharge the juryif it is of the opinion that further
deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which
case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." 2 The Virginia
Code states that "[i]n the event the jury cannot agree as to the penalty, the court
46. SeeBdrw 451 US. at 446 (holding that because the sentencing phase resembled a trial
on guilt or innocence that a life sentence found bya jury is an acquittal of death); Rwne 467 U.S.
at 211 (holding that death was barred on retrial because the judge rejected the existence of all the
alleged aggravating factors). Any statute that mandates that the judge is the only sentencer is no
longer constitutional Ri 536 U.S. at 609. Rig holds that any factor that raises the maximum
punishment that a defendant may receive is an element of the offense and must be proven to a jury
beynd a reasonable doubt Id at 602. The only instances in which a judge may serve as the
sentencing authority is when the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury or
pleads guilty.
47. SeeSauazan, 537 U.S. at 112-13 (holding that the statutorilymandated life sentence did
not bar death on retrial because the jury made no findings as to any aggravators); seealso Poland v.
Arizona, 476 US. 147, 156-57 (1986) (holding that death is not barred in a retrial because the
original death sentence was based on an aggravator found in error). In PdarA the United States
Supreme Court held that, for purposes of double jeopardy, the abrogation of a single aggravator
from the first trial did not amount to an acquittal of death because another aggravator was available.
Id at 157. The Court stated that "[a]ggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses,
but are 'standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the alternative verdicts of death and
life imprisonment." Pdar4 476 US. at 156. Because Pdard occurred under Arizona's judge-
sentencing scheme, it is extremely unlikely that a case replicating Pdard will ever occur. Id
48. Satmazahn, 537 U.S. at 113.
49. Id at 112.
50. BMigtu 451 U.S. at 446.
51. Se&SamrAa 537 US. at 104-05 (sumiarizing Pennsyvania's capital sentencing statutes).
52. 42 PA. GCO . STAT. ANN. S 971 1(c)(1)(v) (West Supp. 2003).
[Vol. 16:1
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shall dismiss the jury, and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life." 3 This
similarityindicates that Samazabn will affect the level of protection offered bythe
default life sentence in subsection E. Before Satraza/m, a defendant could hope
for a deadlocked jury on the issue of punishment and receive a life sentence that
barred any subsequent death sentence. After Sauazahn, that protection is no
longer available- death will still be available to the Commonwealth following a
successful appeal.-" Therefore, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment
should be wary of appealing his life sentence.
A jurythat deadlocks on penalty bydefinition has not reached a unanimous
life verdict. Even when a jury does reach a unanimous life verdict, Sauazahn
appears to permit a retrial for death. Sauazahn reinforces that two levels of
capital murder exist- capital life and capital death." These are distinct
offenses.S6 Capital death requires the additional finding of aggravating factors. 7
Capital life, however, does not require the finding of aggravating factors- it is
"murder simpliciter.""8 Therefore, while capital life is a lesser included offense,
capital death is a separate and distinct offense from capital life and requires the
finding of additional elements. 9
The result is that Bd*= w does not survive Satazahn while Runsey does.
BuirCm cannot survive because Saztazahn requires the jury to conclude unani-
mouslythat the State failed to prove the aggravating factors for double jeopardy
to bar death in a new trial.' Ronsey, however, survives because the judge, in a
special verdict, specifically found that the State did not prove the aggravating
factors.61
An additional consideration is the effect of Satazabn on Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.5. Section 19.2-264.5 allows a judge to reverse a jury's death
verdict after reviewing the post-sentence report. 2 If a jury gives death, it has
unanimously found that at least one aggravator was proven.63 If, after review of
53. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(E) (Michie Supp. 2003).
54. Satazah 537 U.S. at 113. An analogy can be made to the hug juy cases. Following
a mistrial because of a hung jury on guik/innocence, the defendant can be retried for the same
offense. Se United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 194, 194 (9 Wheat. 579, 580) (1824) (holding that
discharge of a jurythat failed to reach a verdict does not bar a defendant from being retried on the
same charges).
55. Satzrzam 537 Us. at 111.
56. Id
57. Id
58. See id at 112 (noting the two separate offenses of murder plus one or more aggravators
and murder simpliciter).
59. Id at 111.
60. Id at 113.
61. RumeK 467 US. at 205-06.
62. Sie VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Qichie 2000) (stating that the court may set aside a




the post-sentence report, the judge sets aside the verdict and imposes life with
no explanation, death is still available in a new trial because the capital death
element was proven in the first trial. However, if the jury gives death and the
judge imposes life because no aggravator was sufficiently proven, then death is
barred on retrial. This is so because Rursey supports the premise that a life
sentence bars death on retrial if the judge explicitly finds the absence of aggrava-
tors.
64
This analysis requires inquiry into how the jury reached its unanimous life
verdict. If the jury first unanimously found that the State had failed to prove an
aggravator, the defendant should be acquitted of death because the aggravator,
after Ring, is an element of capital death.65 If, however, the jury unanimously
found that the State has proven at least one aggravator, but, nonetheless, unani-
mously decided upon a life verdict, the State has proven all of the elements of
capital death. In that instance, the life verdict will not be an acquittal of death.66
The difficulty is that verdict forms often do not reveal the jury's findings
on the aggravators. The Virginia statutory verdict forms, for example, make no
provision for the jury to find unanimously the absence of aggravators .6  It
merely states that the jury "considered all of the evidence in aggravation and
mitigation" before sentencing the defendant to life.' This jury verdict form is
certainly insufficient in light of Satakabn. Any jury using this form or a similar
one may sentence a defendant to life without protecting the defendant from
death. A jury that sentences a defendant to life might have found unanimously
that no aggravators were proven or that one or both aggravators were proven,
but that the mitigation was sufficient to overcome the aggravating factor(s). The
jury's life verdict upon such a form is entirely unrevealing about whether it did
or did not make a unanimous finding that an aggravator was proven or not
proven. Verdict forms in federal cases are more revealing, but still inadequate.
Those jury forms require the juryto state whether it did or did not unanimously
64. Rwe, 467 U.S. at 211. The judge sentencing life after explicitly finding the absence of
aggravators is similar to a judge reversing a jury conviction if he finds that the State failed to prove
its case. A defendant cannot be retried for the same offense if the judge reverses a guilty verdict
by finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S.
40,45 n.5 (1981) (noting its opinion in Burks v. United States, 437 US. 1 (1978), held that a retrial
is barred when the "[s]tate has failed as a matter of law to prove its case despite a fair opportunity
to do so").
65. Sam.,izb, 537 U.S. at 111.
66. Sw d at 112 (holding that only a unanimous finding that the State had failed to prove any
aggravators will result in an acquittal of death).
67. S& VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(D) (Mlchie Supp. 2003) Qacling language indicating that
the jury unanimously found the absence of aggravating factors).
68. SoeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(D)(2) ("We the jury, on the issue joined, having found
the defendant guilty of (here set out statutory language of the offense charged) and having consid-
ered all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of such offense, fix his punishment at @
imprisonment for life .... .
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find an aggravator proven."' The forms do not require the juryto state whether
it unanimously found an aggravator not to be proven."0 Failure to find unani-
mously an aggravator proven is, of course, not the same as unanimously finding
that the aggravator was not proven.
In a Virginia case, a life-sentenced defendant can never establish that his
jury did or did not unanimously find aggravators proven or not proven."
Sattazabn, thus, implies that any Virginia life-sentenced defendant can be retried
for death.72 In a federal case, a life-sentenced defendant whose jury did find at
least one aggravator can be retried for death. 3 A life-sentenced federal defen-
dant whose jurystated that it did not unanimously find any aggravators can also
be retried for death because he cannot establish that his juryunanimously found
that no aggravator was proven.7' Future capital jury verdict forms must be
drafted carefully and tailored specifically to the deliberation process within the
jury room. Those forms must indicate explicitly whether the jury found future
dangerousness and/or vileness beyond a reasonable doubt and, if it did not,
whether it unanimouslyfound that the Commonwealth had failed to prove either
or both aggravators.
There appears to be no Virginia case in which a life-sentenced defendant
would be safe from a retrial for death after a successful appeal. A life sentence
under section 19.2-264.4(E), mandating life if a jury is deadlocked on punish-
ment, does not block death on retrial because of the holding in Saitzaban7 A life
verdict based on the statutoryverdict forms found in section 19.2-264.4(D) does
not provide double jeopardyprotection because the forms do not provide a way
for the jury to show clearly that the life verdict was based on the Common-
wealth's failure to prove at least one aggravating factor. Finally, a life sentence
under section 19.2-264.5 protects a defendant from death on retrial only in the
special case in which a judge imposes life because no aggravators were suffi-
ciently proven- Rtorey protection. If the judge makes no findings about
aggravators, Sawahn applies and death is not barred.
The trial has always been the first battle of a long and rigorous campaign.
With Sa=az4 a life sentence effectively truncates that campaign into a last
stand. Unless the defendant is sentenced to death in the first trial, there will
seldom be reason to appeal and risk the death sentence.
69. U.S. Cr. OF APPEALS FOR THE 8THQRCuIT, 8TH 0RCITJURYINSTRUCTIONS, MODEL
DEATH PENALTY JURY INSTRUCTIONS, SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 12.22, at
http.J/www.juryinuuions.ca8.uscourts.gov/ciminalinstructions.htm (last visited Oct. 25,2003).
70. Id
71. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(D) (Michie Supp. 2003).
72. See Satazm, 537 US. at 112-13.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 113.
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II. 7he DaSenrenai Goa Dornant
Given Sauazabn it is apparent that an appeal seeking reversal of a capital
defendant's life sentence may not be in his best interest. An appeal is the only
viable course of action for a defendant already sentenced to death. Unlike
appeals pursued by life-sentenced defendants, which are discretionary, a defen-
dant sentenced to death is given an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia. 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia considers trial error and must decide
whether the sentence was influenced by passion or prejudice and whether the
sentence was disproportionate to the punishment in similar cases.77 After review,
the court may affirm the death sentence, commute the sentence to life, remand
for a new sentencing phase, or recommend a new trial." If the Supreme Court
of Virginia overturns the death sentence on disproportionalitygrounds, the court
must commute the sentence to life and there is no resentencing proceeding. 9
If the court reverses based on trial error, the defendant will be awarded a new
trial in its entirety" Defendants in this case will, therefore, be tried and sen-
tenced bythe same retrial jury. Defendants who succeed on an appeal based on
sentencing phase error or passion/prejudice grounds will be awarded onlya new
sentencing proceeding."' When the Supreme Court of Virginia remands the case
for a new sentencing phase, section 19.2-264.3(C) of the Code provides for a
resentencing proceeding before a new jury.2 This newlyempaneled jurywill lack
evidence crucial to its determination between life and death.
In its conception, the bifurcated system was developed to provide the
sentencing bodywith a fair procedure to determine a defendant's punishment. 3
76. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(A) (Michie 2003) ("A sentence of death, upon the
judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit coun, shall be reviewed on the record by the
Supreme Court").
77. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C) (describing factors the court must examine when
reviewing a death sentence on automatic appeal).
78. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(D) (describing the actions that the Supreme Court of
Virginia may take after reviewing an automatic appeal of a death sentence). The court can only
recommend a new trial if the defendant alleges trial error. GC-mmI, 546 S.E.2d at 452 (ordering a
new trial because allowing an unqualified juror to remain on the jury constitutes manifest error).
79. When the Supreme Court of Virginia makes that decision, it has, in effect, decided that
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. This decision is an appellate acquittal of death
and can be ana1 to when an appellate court reverses a conviction because it finds that the
prosecution's evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. SeeBwks, 437 U.S at 18 (holding that
double jeopardy bars a second trial when a reviewing court fimds the evidence legally insufficient).
80. Gm I, 546 S.E2d at 452
81. Seesra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3(C) (Mlchie 2000) ("If the sentence of death is subse-
quently set aside or found invalid, and the defendant or the Commonwealth requests a jury for
purposes of resentencing, the court shall impanel a different jury on the issue of penalty.").
83. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 195 (1976) (arguing that "concerns ... that the penalty
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance").
[Vol. 16:1
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Because guilt and punishment are determined bya single jury, impressions from
the guilt phase are retained in the sentencing phase bythe jury.4 Evidence only
relevant to sentencing is not presented in the guilt portion of the trial because
that evidence is not relevant and might be prejudicial to the defendant on the
issue of guilt." A resentencing jury, however, is deprived the impressions that
are normally created in the guilt phase and ends up deciding life or death on less
evidence than was available to the original sentencing jury."'
Admittedly, in a situation in which there is a single defendant and the
question of guilt or innocence is very clear, this practice is not necessarily
prejudicial. However, for example, if mental condition is at issue, much of the
mitigating evidence is front-loaded in the guilt phase."' If the defendant is found
guilty, the juryis given a second dose of this evidence in the mitigation phase.8
This proves to be crucial because, although juries may not be absolutely con-
vinced that the defendant suffers from a mental abnormality, the introduction
of mental condition evidence in the guilt phase and reintroduction in the sen-
tencing phase at least creates the possibility of influencing a jury's decision for
life. 9 A resentencing juryhears the evidence only once. That jurywill not have
the opportunity to mull over how the mental condition may have affected the
defendant's action during the crime. Also, a resentencing jury may never hear
the evidence regarding the role of the victim during the commission of the crime
or whether, in the case of co-defendants, there is some doubt as to the responsi-
bility of the defendant that is being resentenced.
Fundamentally, the defendant's original trial provides him with a more
complete proceeding. The original jury had the opportunity to hear the whole
case from two opposing points of view.' That jury also had the chance to
84. Segom-UyScott E. Sundby, Tr7eapitJwryardAsiduaior 7be*nIsexai dSmora
Rone, andtheDb Pen&! 83 CORNELLL REV. 1557 (1998) [hereinafter Sundby, The Q ]pitajwy
and A h1dmoi] (examining how remorse is perceived and how it affects juries when choosing
whether to sentence a defendant to life or death); Scott E. Sundby, 7he CpiUJwyardEnpts 7he
Penm cf W y and Umur* Vian,, 88 QORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003) [hereinafter Sundby, 7z
QApira1J arndEnp] (examimnig how behavior of victims affects a jury's decisionmaking when
choosing between sentencing a defendant to life or death).
85. GM 428 US. at 190.
86. Sees"ma note 84 and accompanying text.
87. Se John H Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Column, Caia1 Gua: PAir ci
Dad~ niPtsM-,gMea Had=hETide?=r Crtimmul Oasz, 24 h- iAMPION 63,67-68 (Nov.
2000) (describing the application of front-loading the mitigation).
88. Id at 68; see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (lchie Supp. 2003) (including extreme
mental or emotional disturbance and significant impairment "of dendant... to conform his
conduct to requirements of law" as possible mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase).
89. Bhwm& Lernn* sspa note 87, at 68. Blume and Leonard quoted a juror who served on
a juy that gave life to a defendant who front-loaded evidence of mental retardation into the guilt
phase. Id 'We weren't sure he was mentally retarded, but we weren't sure he wasn't either.'"
Id
90. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (stating that the adversarial system is premised
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observe the defendant's reactions as the guilt phase played out." Although the
purpose of the bifurcated system is to create a clear demarcation between the
purposes of the guilt and sentencing phases, the jurystill carries observations and
information from the guilt phase that influences its sentencing decision.92 A
resentencing jury is denied an opportunity to hear both sides of the case or to
observe the defendant through the trial process.
A. A Brf'History Lesson
The use of a separate sentencing phase in capital cases is actually a very
recent creation. America's practice of executing criminals is rooted in England,
in which the death sentence was applied to as many as 222 different crimes by
the 1700s."' Even before the United States gained independence, its citizens
struggled with the morality of the death penalty. 4 Over the next century and a
half, support for the death penaltywaxed and waned and resulted in fewer crimes
punishable by death and in the abolition of the death penalty in some states.9"
States began to seek rehabilitation rather than retribution.'
The movement towards rehabilitation materialized as the principle of
individualization, which grasped a foothold and gained momentum over the first
half of the twentieth century.97 To determine a just sentence, this principle
requires that information beyond what is sufficient for a conviction is
necessary.9 In 1949 the United States Supreme Court, in Wliars v NewYork,"
recognized that the nature of sentencing required a more flexible standard of
on truth and fairness and is "best discovered by statements on both sides of the question" (quoting
Irving R Kaufman, Dow deJwHazeaRigt o 4diiad Cmd?, 61 A.B.A.J. 569,569 (1975))).
91. Sundby, The CaiJwyardAaduion, sura note 84, at 1561.
92. Id at 1588.
93. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY, PART I, 3, at
http.J/deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did-410# IntroductionoftheDeathPenaltyast
visited Sept. 16, 2003). Crimes included stealing and cutting down a tree. Id Great Britain's death
penalty practice also went through is own evolution. Id By 1837, 100 of the 222 crimes punish-
able by death were eliminated. Id
94. Id at 7. Virginia was the first colonyto attempt to limit application of the death penalty
by eliminating capital punishment for all crimes except for murder and treason. Id The bill,
however, was defeated by one vote. Id
95. Id at 11-13.
96. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (stating that automatic death
sentences have retreated in the face of individualized sentencing and that the practice of probation
is one example in which indeterminate sentences have taken the place of rigidlyfixed punishments).
97. Se Caren Myers, Note, Enriangvg Allaaim A t CGpizl Sewrirg A Pvpaifir Use
Inmaoh 97 COLUmL.REv. 787,793 (1997) (arguing that defendants should be provided immunity
regarding guilt or innocence in subsequent proceedings when making their allocution because it
furthers the goals of the separate sentencing phase by supplying the sentencing body with greater
information with which to determine punishment).
98. Id
99. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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presenting evidence than the standard for determining guilt.1"° "[B]y careful
study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less
severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizen-
ship.""' Therefore, a differentiation between evidence for sentencing and
evidence for guilt was necessaryand, to a certain extent, common law sentencing
inherently did realize that differentiation. 12
Under common law sentencing, the jury's role ended upon conviction of
the accused.' 3 The judge then heard any evidence relevant to sentencing and
determined the sentence."° However, capital cases utilized a unitary trial pro-
ceeding in which the jury determined both the guilt and the penaltyin the same
proceeding.'05 Thus, the jury heard evidence relevant to sentencing that was not
separated from evidence relevant to determining guilt." 6 This design affected a
defendant's presumption of innocence byallowing the jurrto base its determina-
tion of guilt on evidence relevant only to sentencing. 10 States resolved this
quandarybymoving toward a bifurcated system- separate proceedings for guilt
and sentencing.' This structure allowed a juryto focus on one issue at a time.
In the guilt phase, the focus is on the factual circumstances of the crime itself.0 9
The sentencing stage fulfilled the concept of individualized punishment by
addressing the character of the defendant and the heinousness of the crime."'
1. Boratad Trials- Not a New Id
The bifurcation of trials has been in practice in one form or another for
over a century. Initially, states split trials between a guilt phase and an insanity
phase."' This procedure intende to provide jurors with a clear demarcation
between evidence tending to inculpate the defendant and evidence tending to
100. Wdhin, 337 U.S. at 247 ("And modem concepts individualizing punishment have made
it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportuity to obtain pertinent
information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable
to the trial.").
101. Id at 249; se also Kristen F. Grunewuld & Priya Nata, Article, D46eBzai Viaim
OCauzd- RawttiseJeo in Capita Cuf, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 315, 322-25 (2003) (describing the
development of restorative justice and rehabilitation).






108. Myers, s"p-a note 97, at 795.
109. Id
110. Id at 796.
111. SeVerlaSeetinNeslund, Comment, 7heBoa2ati Tiak Is It UsaiMoe Thm It Is Usi?,
31 EMORYLJ. 441,441-45 (1982) (stating that the bifurcation of insanitycases inthe United States
was first enacted over a century ago in Wisconsin in 1878).
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exculpate the defendant on the grounds of legal incapacity."' Despite this intent,
the practice of bifurcation in cases in which insanityis a defense has declined in
the past few decades and is mandated by statute in only a few states."'
In the late 1950s, states began to consider replacing the more common
unitarytrial system for capital cases with a bifurcated trial system.1 4" California
and Pennsylvania started the trend and Connecticut, New York, Texas, Georgia,
and Florida followed into the early 1970s."' In 1972 the United States Supreme
Court decided Fwmmv GQi' 16 in which the Court found that a death penalty
statute that placed unbridled discretion in a sentencing bodyviolated the Eighth
112. Id at 441.
113. Id at 442-43. Since 1970, adozen states have refused to applybifurcated trials to insanity
cases. Id at 442. The state supreme courts of Arizona, Florida, and Wyoming have held that
statutes are unconstitutional if they require bifurcated trials when insanity is used as a defense. Id
at 442. Only California, Colorado, and Wisconsin mandate this practice through state statutes. Id
at 443; see aho Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Neossity or tr Bi o r fo a Ctrin-d Trial en Issue f
IwnityDqifme 1 A.L.R4THSUPP. 155 (2003) (listing California, Colorado, and Wisconsin as the
only states requiring bifurcation of guilt and insanity by statute). Several courts have found that
applying a bifurated system i cases in which insanityis a defense is unconstittionaL Seeg., Statev. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715, 724 (Ariz. 1970) (holding explicitlythat a bifurcation statute unconstitution-
affydenied criminal defendan ts due process because it exduded evidence of mental condition as a
deene to the prosecution's assertion of intent during the guilt trial); State x ,. Boyd v. Green,
355 So. 2d 789, 794 (Fla. 1978) (holding that its statutory bifuircated trial system unconstitutionallydenied due process to defendants raising the insanitydefense); Sanchez. v. State, 567 P.2d 270,280
(Wyo. 1977) (holding that the state's bifurcation statute violated the due process clauses of the state
ard federal constWtions).
Bifurcated proceedings in cases in which insanity is a defense are mandated by statute in
California, Colorado, and Wisconsin. SeeC_,LPENAL GODE S 1026(a) (West 2003) (providing that:"if defendant pleads only not guilty by reason of insanity, then the question whether the defendant
was sane or insane at the tim e offense was committed shall be promptlytried, either before the
same jury or before a new jury"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. S 16-8-104 (West Supp. 1996) ("Theissues raised bythe plea of not guitybyreason of isanityshallbe tried separatelyto different juries,
adthe sanityof the defendant shall be tried first."); WIS. STAT. ANN. 971.165(1)(a) (West 1998)
("The plea of not guilty shall be determined first and the plea of not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect shall be determined second. ).
114. Myers, supr note 97, at 795 n.38 (stating that the California legislature adopted a
bifurcated system for capital cases in 1957).
115. SeScott W. Howe, TheFailMiGaseforEi~tbA n odfiqdxptael-Sertf
Trjs, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 842 n.181 (1998) (stating that California and Pennsylvaniaaope
bifurcated trials in the 1950s, joined by Connecticut, New York and Texas in the 1960s; Georgia
and Florida followed in the early 1970s).
116. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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and the Fourteenth Amendments."' After Fumzn, thirtyfive states enacted new
death penalty statutes prior to the Court's review of Gmegv igia"o 8 in 1976.119
2. Gregg v. Georgia
In Cm% the United States Supreme Court stated that a bifurcated system,
patterned after the Model Penal Code, is the best method to ensure that the
death penalty is not "imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner." 120 The
Court reviewed the Georgia sentencing scheme to determine whether the statute
provided necessary guidance to overcome Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
objections.' The Grg Court argued that the imposition of the death penalty
is constitutional and, in particular, it is the manner or procedure in which the
sentence is given that must pass constitutional muster22 The Court stated:
[W]hen a human life is at stake and when the jury must have informa-
tion prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of
penaltym order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is
more lkely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies
identified in Fwmm
123
Gm& recognized that jury sentencing is preferable in capital cases because it
maintains the " 'link between contemporary community values and the penal
system.' "124 However, it is difficult for a jury in a unitary trial to separate
evidence relevant to sentencing that is not admissible for guilt. To resolve this
difficulty, the Court clarified its support for bifurcation.'25 "[These concerns are
best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the
sentencing authorityis apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of
sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information."126 In
117. Furmanv. Georgia, 408 US. 238,239-40 (1972); seeU.S. Q)NsT. amend. VIII ("Exces-
sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, mroud anmdwwupunishnrts iui"
(emphasis added)); US. COST. amend. XIV (stating "nor shall anyState deprive anypersonof life,
liberty, or property, udxwt due p, rs qcf srY (emphasis added)). The Court never clarified an
acceptable standard, but instead issued a per curiarn decision with several opinions in support.
Fwmm, 408 US. at 239.
118. 428 US. 153 (1976).
119. Howe, sura note 115, at 800 n.17 (1998) (stating thirtyfive states passed new death
penalty statutes after Fwom and before 1976); see gnw4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195
(1976).
120. Gm 428 U.S. at 195.
121. Id at 158.
122. Id at 187.
123. Id at 191-92.
124. Id at 190 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
125. Id at 195.
126. Gm 428 US. at 195. The Court did not mandate that a bifurcated trial was the only
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light of Gv everystate in which capitalpunishment is used now provides for
a bifurcated proceeding in capital cases."
B. "WK4 haun't b udmeI' been,128
Jury impressions, residual doubt, attaching responsibilityto co-defendants,
and the role of the victim are all factors that are related to the commission of the
crime and are onlypresented in the guilt phase.'29 Studies have shown that the
demarcation between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase created by bifur-
cation more resembles a sieve than a brick wall. 3' Juries are incapable of forget-
ting the guilt phase proceedings and relying only on the information presented
in the penalty phase to reach their sentences.' Invariably the appearance,
demeanor and reactions of the defendant during the uilt phase proceedings
greatly influence a juror's deliberation of the sentence.
Many jurors decide on punishment as earlyas the presentation of evidence
during the guilt phase.' More commonly, it is the prodeath juror who decides
early.' Therefore, although the purpose of bifurcating capital murder trials was
to separate the unique responsibilities involved in determining guilt and punish-
ment, it is clearly difficult in practice to do this."' But early juror determination
on death is not a foregone conclusion that a defendant will definitely receive the
death sentence.'36 Many jurors still remain undecided through the guilt phase. 1'
solution. I1 It stated that anyproceeding that would comport with the concerns of Fwmm would
be satisfactory. Id
127. Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Pnswaptionqft A Smrtig Pifor a Du Pwos A misz
f4a Smt=4 94 YAE .J. 351, 366 (1984); se aso VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3(Q (Mchie
2000) (stating that "[ the jury finds the defendant guilty of an offense which may be punishable
bydeath, then a separate proceeding before the same jury shall be held").
128. Alex Kotlowitz, In the Faxe f Deat, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 6 (Magazine) at 32
(reporting how a jury, convinced that death was the appropriate punishment at the guilt phase,
ultimately chose life for the defendant after being confronted with mitigation evidence).
129. Sundby, Te pUJwyandEndzh su"r note 84, and accompanying text.
130. Id
131. Id at 371.
132. Sundby, 7he p JwyardA hdtiop, s"a note 84, at 1561.
133. Melissa E. Whitman, Article, C&,m uith Capi"lw ui: How L #e Veasw Dath
Dersions A remade, What Penuades, adHowto Mst Efaidy Cmniat te Nea fra Venia cf L,
11 CAP. DEF. J. 263, 282 (1999) (recommending trial strategies to better communicate to capital
juries).
134. Id
135. Id at 281; salso Kotlowitz, sura note 128, at 36 (reporting that towards the end of the
guilt phase the jurors drew a picture of an electric chair on a chalkboard).
136. Whitman, supra note 133, at 282.
137. Id
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1. Ranone
An especially important factor in a juror's decision is the defendant's
showing of remorse.' "[A]ssessments of character and remorse maycarrygreat
weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the [defendant] lives or
dies."139 In a study conducted by the Capital Jury Project, Professor Scott
Sundby stated that "jurors frequently cited a defendant's lack of remorse as a
significant factor in precipitating their decision to impose the death penalty.""4
Because few defendants testify, jurors based their impression of remorse on
demeanor and behavior at trial and "the nature of the defendant's actions at the
time of the crime." 4'
Jurors who sentenced a defendant to death often were influenced by the
defendant's apparent lack of emotion during the trial.' 2 The study pointed out
one instance in which the defendant laughed during the proceedings and openly
engaged in flirtatious behavior with one of the jurors. 43 This defendant was
then sentenced to death.' 4 The jurors who selected death admitted that had the
defendant shown any indication of remorse through his behavior at trial, they
would have sentenced the defendant to life instead. Life jurors observed very
similar behavior, although they used very different adjectives to describe it."4
Because life and death jurors perceive the physical attributes of remorse
very similarly, the proper remorse analysis should focus "on whether [the
defendant] owns up to his actions in some manner and accepts some responsibil-
ityfor what he has done." 47 Defendants who denied anyresponsibility at all are
more likely to be sentenced to death.'4' Conversely, defendants who admit to
138. Sundby, ,heCT JwyanAd, ai*s, note 84, at 1558 (stating "that a defendant's
lack of remorse often plays an influential role in shaping the outcome of capital trials").
139. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. Sundby, 71v CpitaljwyandA lduoiw, spra note 84, at 1558.
141. Id at 1561.
142. Id at 1563.
143. Id
144. Id at 1560-63.
145. Id at 1565. Jurors that gave the death sentence often described the defendant's attitude
as "[n]onchalant"; "appeared unconcerned"; "]ust really bored with the whole thing"; "blase,
expressionless"; and "[clocky." Id at 1563-64. Jurors that gave life sentences described the
defendant's attitude as "[h]e justshovwed no emotion"; "[v]eryclinical"; "[h]e appeared relaxed"; "he
was just trying to be a tough guy." Id at 1566.
146. Sundby, 7he Capital wyandA &d&* supra note 84, at 1567.
147. Id at 1573-74.
148. Id at 1574-75. With the rising number of individuals being released from prison for
wrongful convictions, the question arises, how can an innocent person accept anyresponsibilityfor
a crime that he or she never committed? SeegrayDEATHPENALTYINFO. Cr1, 100THDEATH
Row EXONEREE FREED IN ARIZONA DNA EVIDENCE VrNDICATES MAN WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED OF 1991 MURDER, at http://www.deathpenahyinfo.org/article.php?
scid-1&did=283 (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
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culpability, but contest the degree, are more likelyto receive a sentence of life. 49
In short, a range of subtle factors are developed in the guilt phase that influence
the jury's perception of remorse.
The timing of the defendant's display of remorse is just as inportant.1'i
"[T]he earlier the defendant personally expresses some type of acceptance of
responsibility for the kiing, the greater likelihood that the jury will be receptive
to later claims of regret.""'5 Statements of regret that are expressed in the penalty
phase, without any prior indications in the guilt phase, are often considered
"disingenuous attempts to avoid the death sentence."" 2 The earlier the defense
laid the groundwork, the less likelythat the jurors would dismiss the defendant's
expression of remorse as manipulative.5 3 Most cases that resulted in life sen-
tences involve a unified and coherent theme that bridges the guilt and the penalty
phases.1"
Resentencing juries do not get the opportunityto develop these factors and
to judge the level of remorse a defendant exudes. They will not see the de-
meanor or behavior of the defendant in relationship to evidence of the crime
because evidence of guilt is presented onlyto the original jury. The resentencing
jury only hears a summary of the previous proceedings."5 ' If the defendant
showed remorse by admitting responsibility for the crime, he will be denied the
benefits of that admission defense. The summary of the Commonwealth will
not indicate any sign of remorse; it will show only that the defendant admitted
to the crime. Also, a resentencing jurywill lack the impression of the finely laid
theme that defense attorneys introduce in the guilt phase." A resentencing jury
that only hears the remorseful statements of a defendant at sentencing, without
the cohesive theme that the defense attorneys carefully craft during the guilt
phase, is more likely to conclude that such statements are disingenuous.'57
The showing of remorse in resentencing can also be affected deleteriously
by the defendant's incarceration on death row while awaiting appeal or a new
trial. Upon conviction, the defendant is placed into an environment in which his
humanity is stripped away.5 ' Death row inmates are confined in isolation for
149. Sundby, The GCpitaJwyarnA kdtai, supra note 84, at 1584.
150. SeeWhitman, s"pra note 133, at 275 (noting that "the earlier defendants express remorse
the better").
151. Sundby, 7he C ial Jwy ardA lhduti, s"ra note 84, at 1586.
152. Id at 1587.
153. Id at 1587-88.
154. Id at 1594.
155. Stocktonv. Commonweakh, 402 S.E.2d 196,204 (Va. 1991) (stating that use of the guil
phase transcript is appropriate for the purpose of informing the jury of the nature of the offense
and the circumstances under which it was committed).
156. Sundby, The Capitalr Iy ani A &dtibt; supra note 84, at 1594.
157. Id at 1586-87.
158. G. Richard Strafer, Vdu migfor Exeagic& C Vdvnis and te Pmiy f
7bidPartyInaw 74 J. QIM. L &CQumNoLOGY 860,871 (1983) (stating that, unlike termi-
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extraordinarily long periods, are not integrated into the general prison popula-
tion, and are not provided privileges available to non-death inmates.'" Prison
conditions combined with the prolonged uncertainty of the appellate process
result in manydeath row inmates simplygiving up.W0 Generally, manydeath row
inmates are racked with intense remorse, but have simply given way to despair
as theyperceive the seeming futilityof their cause.'6 ' A resentencing jury, instead
of seeing the remorseful defendant accepting the gravity of his crime, will sit in
judgment of a defendant no longer able to express emotion at all.
2. Re qctfd Viaim
The jury's impression of the victim carries as much weight, if not more, as
the defendant's expression of remorse in determining sentencing. Jurors often
discuss the victim's role in the crime and the victim's character during delibera-
tions. 62 If the juror identifies with the victim, that juror is more likelyto sen-
tence the defendant to death.6 ' Jurors considered victims who engaged in
mundane activities as innocent because they happened to be in the wrong place
at the wrong time." On the other hand, jurors who perceive the victim as
distasteful or engaging in high-risk or antisocial behavior are more likelyto give
life sentences. 6 ' In this regard, jurors focus more on the activity of the victim
in the moments leading up to the murder than on the victim's general
reputation.'
Virginia allows the role of the victim to be presented in mitigation if he or
she participated in the crime or consented to it. 67 However, much of the
evidence regarding the victim's conduct is material to the crime itself and is
nally ill patients who usually have strong life-affirming support systems, death row inmates are
subjected to a -life-negating" environment in which death row inmates are subjected to imprison-
ment in remote locations, provided limited visitation rights, and that the inmate and his visitor are
subjected to further indignities during visitation).
159. Id at 869. The article mentions "rehabilitative" programs and exercise as privileges
provided to non-death inmates that death row inmates are not given. Id
160. Id at 868 (quoting one prisoner ling the uncertainty to a vise pulling the prisoner in
two separate directions and stating that many prisoners mentioned a prefereace for suicide).
161. Id at 865.
162. Sundby, The CptauJwyandEnpd s"pm note 84, at 350.
163. Id at 359.
164. Id Activities that the victims were performing included using the ATM, the bathroom,
and filling the car with gas. Id
165. Id at 357 tbL11.
166. Id at 370.
167. Se VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B)(i) Oiie Supp. 2003) (noting the situation in
which "the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act").
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presented in the guilt phase.168 Like the issue of remorse, impressions of the
victim's relationship to the crime are carried by the jurors from the guilt phase
into the penalty phase and greatly influence a jury's determination between a
sentence of life or death.169 In a resentencing proceeding, the juryis not exposed
to the same degree to the participation or the character of the victim. If the
victim contributed to the commission of the crime byhis or her practice of high-
risk activity, a resentencing jury should have the opportunity to consider that
activity during its deliberations.
C ResiW Dcsd
"Residual doubt acts as an operative mitigating factor when juries decide
not to impose a death sentence because they are not absolutely certain of the
defendant's guilt.""'7 Residual doubt or "lingering" doubt is defined as:
(1) actual, reasonable doubt about guilt of any crime; (2) actual, rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of a capital offense, as
opposed to other offenses; (3) a small degree of doubt about (1) or
(2), sufficient to cause the juror not to want to foreclose (by execu-
tion) the possibility that new evidence might appear in the future."11
The concept implies that the evidence presented in the guilt phase lacks the
persuasiveness to convince a juror of the defendant's absolute guilt."" Jurors
report that the reason whytheir juries returned life sentences was because of the
juries' belief that there existed some inkling of doubt as to the defendant's
guilt.
73
A recent studyfound that residual doubt maynot playas significant a factor
in capital sentencing deliberations as previously believed.' 4 Most jurors could
not distinguish between reasonable doubt and residual doubt.17 In fact, many
jurors were offended when asked by the study whether during the sentencing
phase they ever entertained the idea that the defendant might be innocent.' 6
The only exceptions that the study found to the concept of residual doubt were
168. Sundby, The C ra1yandEwud); s"pra note 84, at 354.
169. Id at 371.
170. CJuistinaS.PignatelArtic,ResiullD t: IftsaLoSawr, 13 CAP.DEF.J. 307,313-14
(2001) (examining the public, judicial, and legislative response to the role of residual doubt).
171. William S. Geimer &Jonathon Amsterdam, WhyJurors Vote Life or Deathr Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death PenalyCases, 15 AMtJ. IJvL L. 1, 27 (1987-88) (positing that juries
findi aggravating and mitigating factors operate far differently in practice than wvs intended in
172. Pignatelli, suWa note 170, at 307.
173. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 171, at 27 (defining lingering doubt).
174. Sundby, 7he G* Jrwy andA Idiaia, supra note 84, at 1577.
175. Id at 1578-79.
176. Id at 1578.
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cases with multiple defendants and those in which the prosecution presented
mostly circumstantial evidence.'77 The jurors were unsure as to the defendant's
actual level of participation in the crime.178 Each of these juries felt that death
should be reserved only for the ringleader and returned a life sentence for the
less culpable defendant.'79
Although residual doubt maynot play a great role in everycase, it nonethe-
less can playa significant role for many defendants. In Lcckhbrt u McCa,"° the
United States Supreme Court recognized that one of the benefits of unitary
juries, or a single jurypresiding over the guilt and penaltyphases, in capital cases
was the idea of residual doubt.'' The Court stated that "it seems obvious to us
that in most, if not all, capital cases much of the evidence adduced at the guilt
phase of the trial will also have a bearing on the penalty phase.""8 2
Although the Court has held that a defendant does not have a constitutional
tight to a jury instruction on residual doubt, it has largely left the application of
residual doubt at sentencing to the states .183 The federal government acknowl-
edges the defendant's interest in residual doubt and allows for it to be used as a
mitigating factor.8 4 Virginia, however, does not.8 ' In Stcfetan the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that residual doubt cannot be argued at a new sentencing
hearing because the issue of guilt was already decided.'86
Whether a state allows or denies an instruction on residual doubt as a
mitigating factor, residual doubt may still play a role in a jury's sentencing
decision.'87 The United States Supreme Court recognized that, even though a
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction, the defendant's interest in the
residual doubt claim still exists.'88 Resentencing juries lack the lingering doubt
177. Id at 1577.
178. Id at 1580.
179. Id at 1581.
180. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
181. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 US. 162, 181 (1986) (agreeing with the State of Arkansas's
argument that defendants might benefit at sentencing from a jury's residual doubt about evidence
presented in the guilt phase).
182. Id
183. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988) (stating that the Court has never held
that a defendant has a constitutional right to a juryinstruction regarding residual doubt); Pignatelli,
s" note 170, at 312.
184. S&-18 U.S.C S 3592(a)(8) (2000) (stating that "anyother circumstance of the offense that
mitigate against imposition of the death sentence").
185. Se StDeat, 402 S.E.2d at 206-07 (precluding argument about residual doubt because
guilt had already been determined in the first phase of the trial).
186. Id at 207.
187. Geimer & Amsterdam, sura note 171, at 28-34; seealsoPignatelli, supra note 170, at 314
(stating that comments from capital jurors in Virginia indicated that their own residual doubt
affected their decision to recommend life sentences.
188. L dant, 476 U.S. at 181.
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that original trial juries may harbor. A resentencing jury will never hear that
there were other actors in the commission of the murder or that the weapon was
never recovered."9 That tiny scrap of information can mean the difference
between life and death.
D. The Sdumm
The solution is verysimple. At minimum, to provide a fair process for the
defendant the defense should be included in preparing the summary of the guilt
phase for the newlyempaneled resentencing jury. The inclusion of the defense
can be conducted in one of two ways: (1) allow the defense to present informa-
tion from the guilt phase directly to the jury; or (2) have the defense and Com-
monwealth collaborate, in advance, on the guilt phase summaryto be presented
to the new resentencing jury. There is no need for a completely new trial. Nor
is a jury instruction on residual doubt or the role of the victim
required- Virginia precedent prevents the relitigation of guilt because it was
already properly resolved." °
Allowing the defense to present information from the guilt phase may cause
problems. The presentation of information from the guilt phase to the new jury
by each side may resemble a mini-trial on the issue of guilt. Information pre-
sented in this fashion may prove confusing to the jury.
Allowing the defense and the Commonwealth to formulate the summary
is preferable. First, it maybe less confusing to the jury because it preserves the
single messenger practice that is used currentlyin resentencing proceedings. The
Commonwealth's attorney still presents the summary to the new jury, but the
summary itself is a collaborative work between the Commonwealth and the
defense. Alternatively, the judge, in his role as a neutral player, can present the
joint summary to the jury. Secondly, with both sides working together on the
summary, a fuller picture of the crime can be relayed to the new jury. Lastly, in
fulfilling the goal of individualized sentences, information from the guilt phase
that is beneficial to the defendant will aid the jury in determining the most
appropriate sentence.
IV. CQztdmion
In light of Satazabn attorneys should be aware that appealing a life sentence
may put their client's life at risk 91 Unless the life sentence is accompanied by
a finding that no aggravating circumstances were proven, double jeopardy may
not protect the defendant from a subsequent sentence of death on retrial.'92 A
189. Se Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402,419-25 (1987) (affirming the life sentence of
a defendant in a case in which there were multiple defendants); May v. State, 710 So. 2d 1362,
1369-70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that the defendant was sentenced to life in a case in which
no weapon was recovered).
190. Svokrai 402 S.E.2d at 207.
191. Sav4 537 US. at 112.
192. Id
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successful appeal would place the defendant back into a death-possible position.
Double jeopardy, of course, does not apply in the instance where the
defendant was sentenced to death. Juries base many of their decisions for life
or death on facts and impressions garnered in the guilt phase. Current practice
onlyprovides resentencing juries with one point of view- the Commonwealth's.
To resolve this inherent unfairness, defense counsel should be permitted to
introduce limited guilt phase evidence that maybear on sentencing. The prefera-
ble solution is to incorporate defense issues into the summary presented by the
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth could continue to present the summary,
but the final product would provide a more complete picture of the guilt phase
for the new jury.

